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Asia faces very large infrastructure funding demands, estimated at around US$750 billion 
per year for energy, transport, telecommunications, water, and sanitation during 2010–2020 
(ADB/ADBI 2009). Asia has large savings, significant international reserves, and rapid 
accumulations of funds that could be utilized for meeting these infrastructure investment 
needs, but Asian markets have failed to use available resources to channel funding into 
highly needed infrastructure projects. This paper explores issues and challenges in financing 
infrastructure for seamless Asian infrastructure connectivity and for other high priority 
development financing needs, and seeks methods and instruments to help direct Asian and 
international resources to cost-effectively and efficiently support infrastructure and other 
development needs. The paper discusses three important topics: First, what are the lessons 
for Asia from the European Union’s experience of developing and integrating financial 
markets and using development banking institutions to support infrastructure investment? 
Second, how can Asian public and private resources, such as pension funds, social security 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, and private portfolio funds contribute to infrastructure 
development across Asia? Third, can Islamic financial markets provide funds for Asian 
infrastructure development? Finally, the paper makes recommendations regarding financing 
options and how Asian financial markets and infrastructure companies could be further 
developed and integrated to mobilize Asian and other regions’ savings for financing priority 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The costs of building and upgrading the Asia-Pacific region’s infrastructure to meet the basic 
needs of its citizens and industries and raise standards and quantity levels to those 
comparable to advanced countries are huge. During 2010–2020, it is estimated that Asia will 
need to invest approximately US$8 trillion in overall national infrastructure for energy, 
transport, telecommunications, water, and sanitation.  In addition, the region will need to 
spend approximately US$300 billion on regional pipeline infrastructure projects
2 in transport, 
energy, and telecommunications. This amounts to an overall infrastructure investment need 
of about US$750 billion per year during this 11-year period (for details see ADB/ADBI 2009 
and Bhattacharyay 2010). Financially, the demand for cross-border and regional 
infrastructure funding will often directly compete with funding for improved national 
infrastructure
3
Asia has an abundance of resources that can be utilized to meet these financing needs. 
Table 1 shows how the total annual savings of the eleven Asian economies were a massive 
US$4 trillion in 2007 and US$3.6 trillion in 2006. Moreover, the stock of total official 
international reserves reached US$3.7 trillion in 2007 (US$3.1 trillion in 2006). This huge 
pool of Asian savings is sufficient to finance Asia’s infrastructure development if means can 
be found to direct it to that purpose. 
, which will be primarily financed by the home country (national and local) 
authorities. These financial requirements are huge and the result is a very large financing 
gap, or the difference between total financial requirements and the likely available financing 
through direct public resources. However, it simultaneously offers considerable benefits and 
vast investment opportunities for the large savings and international reserves in Asia and the 
Pacific (hereafter referred to simply as Asia).  
                                                  
2 Regional infrastructure projects are defined as: (i) projects that involve physical construction works and/or 
coordinated policies and procedures spanning two or more countries; and (ii) national infrastructure projects 
that have a significant cross-border impact including: (1) their planning and implementation involve cooperation 
or coordination with one or more other countries, (2) they aim to stimulate significant amounts of regional trade 
and income; and (3) they are designed to connect to the network of a neighboring or third country (ADB/ADBI 
2009). 
3 For example, according to the Indian Planning Commission’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, India requires US$500 
billion to US$515 billion during the years up to fiscal year 2011/12 to upgrade its infrastructure and maintain 




Table 1: Gross Domestic Products, Gross Domestic Savings, and Foreign Reserves of 
Selected Countries in Asia, 2006-2007 (in US$ billion) 
Notes:  
Official reserves at 2007 represent values as of the end of the third quarter. 
Data on GDP, savings, and reserves for each economic region are the sum over the countries in the region.  
2005~2006 data on gross domestic saving of Japan are imputed based on trend term, GDP, and second-order lag 
terms of saving itself.  
Sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2007; Asian Development Outlook (2008), ADB, Manila; 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2008), International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.; World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2007), World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
There can be no single path to mobilizing sufficient funding for infrastructure in Asia. The 
funding requirements are too large, widespread, and diverse and will require multiple 
sources of funding. Different forms of financing will be appropriate for different types of 
projects belonging to various sectors and social, legal, or institutional settings. Multilateral 
developments banks, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, and 
bilateral development banks (BDBs) or agencies, like the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), can provide funds 
and facilitate co-financing. However, their ability is quite limited compared with the vast 
needs. Public, private, and mixed funding—such as public-private partnerships (PPP)—will 
all be needed within and beyond Asia. 
Why have Asian economies not been able to fill the financing gaps? Incentives must be 
found to increase the total funding of infrastructure. It is equally important to direct funds to 
where they could be most beneficial, including finding methods for dispersing funds to 
smaller or low income countries that might normally be missed.  
This paper will review various options for financing national and regional infrastructure 
development in Asia to create a pan-Asian infrastructure network that supports basic human 
needs, enhances regional connectivity, promotes intraregional trade and economic 
development, and provides public safety and welfare. Particularly, it will discuss the role of 
financial integration in financing infrastructure with the examination of experiences in Asia 
and other regions, such as the European Union (EU) and Latin America. This paper also 
focuses  on steps that could be taken to raise the needed funds based on the lessons 
learned and prior experiences.  
Country/region  2006  2007 
GDP  Saving  Reserv
es 
GDP  Saving  Reserv
es 
  PRC  2,774  1,313  1,066  3,239  1,384  1,434 
  Hong Kong, China  190  63  133  201  84  141 
  Japan  4,366  1,247  875  4,403  1311  923 
  Korea  888  282  238  958  311  257 
  Taipei,China  356  88  266  372  116  280 
East Asia-5  8,574  2,992  2,579  9,173  3,207  3,034 
  Indonesia  365  105  41  388  140  51 
  Malaysia  156  63  82  175  85  98 
  Philippines  118  22  20  140  47  30 
  Singapore  132  67  136  150  88  152 
  Thailand  206  72  65  237  97  79 
ASEAN-5  977  328  343  1091  457  409 
  India  911  308  170  1085  329  267 
Asia-11  10,461  3,628  3,093  11,349  3,992  3,710 
Excluding Japan  6,095  2,381  2,218  6,946  3,992  3,710 ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the role of financial 
market integration in mobilizing infrastructure funds. It also sets out general steps that can 
support the building of strong and effective integrated financial markets in Asia. Section 3 
reviews the experiences in Asia and other parts of the world, particularly the European Union 
(EU). Section 4 recommends ways, means, and specific changes to institutions and 
programs to address the infrastructure financing gap. This includes the role of major 
financing institutions such as ADB, World Bank, and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). 
The last section concludes with final thoughts and recommendations.  
2.  ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA 
In this paper, it is hypothesized that inefficient and segmented financial markets in Asia 
prevent effective intermediation between Asia’s large savings and Asian investment needs. 
In the absence of effective financial markets with significant penetration throughout the 
region, Asian financial markets are mostly outwardly oriented. Massive savings from net 
export surpluses flow out of Asia through a few Asian financial centers to global financial 
centers, such as New York and London. This process is inefficient in addressing Asia’s 
investment needs and creates a range of serious problems from capital flow management, 
negative carrying costs, and poor investment signals, to difficulties in monetary policy and 
shallow and volatile markets, among others. It also unnecessarily embeds monetary and 
exchange policy decisions made in Washington, London, or Frankfurt into the savings-
investment process in Asia. Efforts to build stronger and more relevant integrated financial 
markets in Asia can thus address such serious issues, and also facilitate the real economic 
adjustments needed to support Asia’s development. 
2.1   Impediments to Intra-Asian Regional Investments 
Why are Asian financial markets and private sector companies failing to adequately 
contribute to regional investments? Some of the answers can be found in several areas 
where there are impediments to effective cross-border flows of investment capital in Asia. 
One major impediment is that, despite reforms, there is still a deficiency in appropriate legal, 
regulatory, and governance frameworks that encourage cross-border investment and 
mitigate political, legal and regulatory risks. Many potential investors may fear that cross-
border  investments are too risky, with uncertain prospects to recover funds or resolve 
commercial disputes in the absence of any dispute settlement mechanisms. Concerns about 
political uncertainties or discrimination against foreign investors might also impede capital 
flows. Development of commercial and legal codes and conflict resolution frameworks, such 
as those envisioned in the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN (ERIA) East Asian 
Community blueprint, can contribute greatly to mitigating these concerns and creating an 
enabling environment.
4 Progress dealing with legal and governance impediments to cross-
border investment is needed.
5
Inhibiting the development of viable infrastructure projects are difficulties in design, cost 
estimation, and technical preparation of bankable cross-border, or regional
 Linking Asian capital markets such as stock and bond 
markets can facilitate cross-border investment. 
6
                                                  
4 On 4 March 2008, a joint Institute for Development Economics/Japan External Trade Organization conference 
“Creating the World’s Largest Business Space” unveiled plans for a unified economic space in Asia including 
all major South and East Asia countries. To support this initiative, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN 
and East Asia (ERIA), located in ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta is preparing a blueprint for integration of 
trade and infrastructure and supporting institutions and policies. Harmonization of commercial codes and 
adjudication of business disputes are key parts of the agenda.  
, infrastructure 
projects. Difficulties also arise in gaining full understanding of all potential risks involved 
5 For in-depth discussions of these issues, please refer to works by Alburo (2010) and Wang (2010). 
6 The terms “cross-border” and “regional” are used interchangeably in this paper.  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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(such as political, socio-economic, operational, and financial), and the pricing those risks. 
Cross-border projects are more complex in many dimensions and are often of larger scale 
compared to national projects. A long, expensive, and technically demanding process is 
required to prepare infrastructure projects that will appeal to international investors and offer 
profits. Feasibility studies for large cross-border projects require considerable financial 
outlays and determining the criteria for sharing these expenses among participating 
countries is challenging. Cross-border infrastructure projects are typically non-rival and/or 
non-excludable and  can be fronted by entrepreneurs, or governments, with possible 
assistance from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Multilateral Development Bank 
(MDBs) such as ADB or the World Bank. Difficulties in locating funding for technical 
preparations, lack of expertise, lack of project implementation capacity, and the absence of a 
prioritized program for development are among the major impediments to effective cross-
boarder project implementation. 
Traditional infrastructure financing—government financing through debt or bonds—has 
severe limitations. Most Asian debt is financed through bank loans, but these loans are 
limited in tenor and expose projects to refinancing risks. The past reliance on government 
funding of infrastructure has stunted the growth of private bond markets and financing, and 
only now that demand for private participation exists,
7
Many of the reasons for the financial sector in Asia having failed to provide the needed 
support for infrastructure finance were discussed in depth in the 2008 OECD-ADBI 
Roundtable on Capital Market Reform in Asia and some key conclusions taken from that 
discussion are summarized in Box 1. Overcoming financial sector impediments to encourage 
efficient flows of private capital, in conjunction with supportive official investment, 
guarantees, and concessional finance, is a necessary component for addressing regional 
infrastructure investment needs and the financing gap. 
 are the tools to support private funding 
being built. Funding can be facilitated by building effective capital markets, but often must 
also be supplemented by public investment initiatives and guarantees to promote the desired 
types of infrastructure investment. This requires efficient and stable financial markets that 
provide investment signals promoting the most productive use of capital for infrastructure.  
 
                                                  
7 For instance, India’s 11th Five Year Plan (2007–2012) has total investment requirements of US$494 billion, 
with private contributions for infrastructure development at nearly 30%. India has adopted an open model that 
encourages foreign investment. India permits 100% foreign direct investments in most sectors and this has 
resulted in large private flows primarily through private equity placements. However, bond market financing 
remains very limited, and promoting bond market development is on the public agenda (Radhakrishnan 2008). ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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High capital intensity of cross-border projects implies a high debt service ratio, long pay-off 
periods, and uncertainty of the forecast traffic volumes or demand. This requires availability 
of appropriate and innovative financial instruments in the financial markets. Equity 
investment is an efficient method for sharing risk between public and private sectors for long 
tenure, cross-border projects. However, several Asian countries do not allow equity 
investment by foreign companies in certain infrastructure sectors. The private sector would 
then have  to bear a higher risk in the form of a debt position in order to participate in 
infrastructure projects in these countries (van der Geest and Nunez-Ferrer 2010). 
Improvements are apparent, but the pace lags behind the potential and important current 
needs  remain unserved. Many countries in the region need to do more to enhance the 
operations and efficiency of their financial markets, but resources for facilitating these efforts 
are often limited. Moreover, the culture of capital market investment needs to be 
substantially strengthened. Overcoming financial sector impediments and aspects of 
financial packages are covered in greater detail later in this paper. 
Box 1: The State of Asian Financial Markets - Conclusions from the 2008 OECD-
ADBI Roundtable on Capital Market Reform in Asia 
Asian financial markets are dominated  by banks, many of which are integrated with 
international interbank markets, allowing the banks to serve as intermediaries between Asian 
sources of capital (generated by high local savings and high export earnings) and global 
interbank markets, which absorb these funds. Capital from international markets comes back 
to Asia through banks, but also through equity markets and foreign direct investment. This 
out-and-in pattern has very successfully supported export expansion and private sector 
construction in many Asian countries. Moreover, until quite recently, it contributed to very 
large accumulations of official reserve assets, as authorities accumulated reserves and 
successfully kept prices under control through sterilization. Also, the condition of banking 
systems steadily improved and banks have built strong capital bases, improved efficiency and 
profitability, and reduced nonperforming loans.  
This system, however, tended to slow the development of deep capital markets that permit 
local lenders and borrowers to lend and borrow across the range of maturities at rates 
reflecting local supply and demand conditions. Banks often failed to serve large communities 
within their countries, which left potential market niches for innovative institutions or capital-
market instruments. Also contributing to the weak impetus to develop capital markets were 
restrictions on cross border investments, lack of institutional underpinnings, lack of legal 
harmonization between countries, exchange rate risks, and lack of market depth and volume, 
which resulted in more volatility and higher costs. The investor base remained small, with 
institutional investors largely missing. Market and prudential information and disclosures were 
weak. Markets remained largely isolated from each other.  
The pattern above is gradually changing, with a deepening of markets and incremental growth 
of equity and bond markets. In particular, there has been significant progress in developing 
local currency bond markets. Also, securitization is being introduced as a way of channeling 
investments into new areas. The improvements are in part due to progress in revamping 
regulations, oversight, and institutions that have improved market conditions. Capital markets 
are deeper, more inclusive, and more open; Legal arrangements are improving; corporate 
governance is better; the regulatory and supervisory frameworks are stronger; and countries 
have adopted international standards and best practices.  




2.2  Regional Financial Integration – A Regional Approach to 
Financing Infrastructure  
The financing of cross-border infrastructure inherently demands a regional perspective, 
because projects that involve more than one country introduce risks that single country 
projects do not face and the financing comes from different economies. It is useful to review 
this situation from the perspective of an integrated Asian economy rather than as the sum of 
needs of individual Asian countries. The regional approach must take into consideration 
exchange rates, inflation, and interest rates, as well as benefit and cost valuation issues over 
time.  
Assessing Asia-wide infrastructure costs and benefits on a consistent basis, uninfluenced by 
varying configurations of exchange rates, national inflation rates, and interest rates, is 
advantageous, because funding costs and the discounting of project costs and services 
benefits are affected.
8
New institutions and markets will be needed to tap savings within the region, to lure private 
and public foreign capital, and direct them to priority infrastructure projects throughout the 
region. The most efficient application of capital infrastructure development will involve 
significant intra-Asia flows of capital because individual country programs may be at odds 
with the optimal regional arrangement, given differences between countries in domestic 
savings and infrastructure needs, and likely externalities in benefits  of infrastructure 
development that are not captured on a national basis. The new regional institutions and 
markets could be structured in two ways: either effectively integrated across the region or 
converged in practice through collaborative national efforts.  
 Premiums for exchange rate risk and country risk will affect the cost of 
borrowing for infrastructure. Differences in inflation performance between countries also 
affects the cost of infrastructure development, with countries that have a history of high 
inflation facing elevated borrowing costs as inflation premiums are built into borrowing rates. 
Considering inter-temporal infrastructure costs is also important, because the structure of the 
individual economies will change as infrastructure systems are developed and countries 
become increasingly integrated into the regional economy, and the valuation of infrastructure 
costs and benefits will change as the infrastructure evolves. 
Each factor mentioned above suffers from the absence of efficient bond markets in Asia, 
which is a tool for tapping long-term capital for use in building infrastructure that usually 
involves long time frames. Long-term bond rates are affected by inflation and exchange rate 
premiums, which vary from country to country. Moreover, without convergence to efficient 
common bond pricing between  economies, their respective capital markets will remain 
separate, which hinders borrowing of large capital and the reallocation of capital to the most 
productive infrastructure projects. Also, without a common bond rate, discounting the value 
of future benefits and costs is difficult.
9
                                                  
8 A unified method of valuing projects through the region should be considered. The International Comparison 
Project (ICP) has shown that national exchange rates can systematically diverge for extended periods from 
appropriate values based on purchasing power parity. Moreover, the specific configuration of exchange rates 
can affect assessments in two ways: the costs of individual cross-border projects are affected by the exchange 
rates between countries, and the exchange rate of Asian currencies vis-à-vis the denominator currency 
(presumably the external currency used to fund most of the imported capital requirements for infrastructure 
development) also affects calculations. Moreover, changes in exchange rates over time, perhaps resulting from 
endogenous economic changes created by the new infrastructure, affect overall valuations. 
  
9 The segmentation of a financial market is likely to result in non-convergence in pricing between two markets for 
similar or identical products. This imperfection in the “law of one price” has been observed even for identical 
equities selling in two economies, even if such non-convergence is very small. This is relevant for the 
infrastructure project in two ways; a security to fund infrastructure in a common currency unit or basket might 
have somewhat different values between countries based on differing liquidity and trading practices, and ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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Based on these considerations, the question arises whether a basket measure of currency 
requirements for infrastructure investment should be constructed to provide a cross-country, 
temporally consistent method of project valuation in different Asian countries.
10 A basket 
could be constructed according to size of the economies, regional purchasing power parity, 
or based on the costs of technical inputs for development of Asian infrastructure, among 
others. This paper, therefore, will examine currency risk exposures of lenders and borrowers 
in cross-border infrastructure projects under different types of currency basket 
arrangements.
11
Many of the issues presented in this sub-section were also faced when the euro was 
created. In the European experience, a virtual currency (the European Currency Unit, ECU) 
was initially used to denominate official cross-border transactions, but it eventually evolved 
to serve as the basis for a real, single currency (the euro) to which the exchange rates of 
individual economies were irrevocable linked. Also, in Europe a major program was put in 
place to fully integrate national financial markets into a single market, which until the onset of 
the financial crisis was notably successful in erasing differences in national risk premiums.
  
12
3.  INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
A full monetary union approach as in the case of Europe is an option, but other approaches 
that would achieve similar benefits must be explored, as a monetary union is not generally 
considered feasible in the Asian context.  
This section investigates issues concerning the development of integrated financial markets 
in Asia and their role in financing regional infrastructure investment in Asia. It includes 
lessons for Asia from financial market integration initiatives in Europe and Latin America, 
covering both the creation of a single integrated market and policy investments that 
promotes infrastructure. It also looks at the potential for using the resources held in 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and mobilizing funds from Islamic Financial Markets. 
3.1  The European Union 
The integration of European financial markets  to support infrastructure development in 
Europe provides important lessons for Asia. Here, the pros and cons of different types of 
integrated regional financial markets supporting infrastructure development are compared 
with a base line of no integration and reliance on individual country markets to promote 
infrastructure. 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) (also called the Euro area) was created in 1999 
based on the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. It was the culmination of a long process of 
economic, political, and social integration that began shortly after World War II. The process 
of financial sector integration in the EU since 1999 can be divided into four stages: 
  Stage 1: In 1999, the Euro area monetary union was created with the euro as the 
single common currency. The euro was used as a virtual currency or accounting unit 
in all member countries. The exchange rate of each national currency was 
                                                                                                                                                     
returns on Islamic bonds (sukuks) and conventional bonds for the same project are unlikely to ever fully 
converge.  
10 The use of a basket of currencies to create a standard measure of value is in some way like creating a virtual 
currency that can be used to denominate transactions and assets. A virtual currency might ultimately evolve 
into a real currency, perhaps in the manner in which the European Currency Unit (ECU) morphed into the euro, 
but evolution into a true currency is not inevitable, especially if political interest in creating a currency is 
missing. 
11 Dealing with intertemporal consistency for a basket is a major challenge.  
12 It is relevant to distinguish between technical financial issues and politico-economic issues in constructing an 
efficient capital market for cross-country infrastructure finance. The financial rationale for integration may be at 
odds with the political environment.  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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irrevocably fixed against the euro, a single monetary policy was introduced and run 
by the European Central Bank (ECB), a common exchange rate and international 
reserves policy was created, and a euro-based clearing system was set up, among 
many other actions. The key goals at this stage were implementation of a common 
monetary and exchange policy.  
  Stage 2: In 2002, the existing national currencies were retired and the euro entered 
circulation as a physical currency in all member countries. The changeover was 
quick and smooth. This fostered integration of currency markets, with free use of the 
currency throughout the union and elimination of national borders for currency.  
  Stage 3: The successful launch of the euro permitted the ECB to refocus attention to 
actively promote creation of a single financial market in which there would effectively 
be no national borders for financial markets in Europe. An example is the Single 
European Payments Area (SEPA) that seeks to make retail and business cross-
border transactions in Europe as easy and cheap as domestic transactions.  
  Stage 4: Geographic expansion of the union began with Greece joining the Euro 
area in 2001. In 2004, the EU expanded eastward and into the Mediterranean to 
bring aboard 10 new members. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. 
Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus have also already joined the Euro area and Slovakia 
joined in 2009. All the new EU countries are legally committed to join the monetary 
union once they meet a set of  rigorous entry requirements.  
3.1.1  Financial Market Integration 
The steps toward greater financial sector integration in Europe are multifaceted and 
complex. Many institutional and policy changes were introduced and harmonized between all 
member countries and with union-level institutions.  
The European Currency Unit (ECU) began in 1975 as the European Unit of Account (EUA) 
to serve the purpose of having a standardized accounting value for projects involving 
multiple European countries, such as the European Development Fund. Following the 
breakup of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971, European countries lacked fixed 
exchange rates to denominate transactions between countries or for community-wide 
purposes. A common measure was needed to set the budget for the European Economic 
Community, for settlements between countries, and for administering the Common 
Agricultural Policy and pricing agricultural commodities. Moreover, the measure of value also 
needed to serve as a measure of future values in order to measure investments and their 
costs and returns over time (EC 1984). 
In the early days of the EMU, implementation of the single monetary policy required 
integration of money markets and markets in short-term capital and creation of a common 
system of clearing in the new currency, all backed up by institutions applying and enforcing 
common standards in all member countries. This was mandatory to ensure monetary control 
and permit transmission of monetary policy impulses throughout the Euro area. After that 
initial stage, new actions and institutions began to be put into place in order to complete the 
integration of European long-term capital markets and retail financial markets (Trichet 2006). 
Box 2 details the levels and types of European programs and institutions supporting financial 






Box 2: Financial Integration Programs and Institutions in Europe 
To support the goal of financial market integration, the ECB and other European institutions are involved in a wide range of 
regional financial programs. The programs fall into three areas: (i) programs that directly support monetary policy by permitting 
short-term monetary policy impulses to course throughout the union; (ii) programs to enhance and integrate equity and bond 
markets; and (iii) programs to integrate business and retail financial markets. Each is considered as necessary to ensure the 
overall efficiency of the market and the effectiveness of the market in providing proper signals that will help channel investment 
into priority markets throughout the continent. This section lists some of the range of tasks and several key programs undertaken 
in Europe to integrate its markets to see what lessons Asia can draw to achieve similar results.  
Monetary Policy Implementation – 
Transmission of Monetary Policy 
Impulses 
Long-term Capital  Retail – 
Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) 
•  TARGET (Trans-European 
Automated Real-Time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer)¹ 
•  EuroI (Bank-sponsored euro 
system)² 
•  Monetary policy deposit and funding 
facilities and interest rate corridor 
•  Collateral for monetary operations 
•  Repo facilities 
•  Service provision – cash settlement 
and real time gross settlement 
systems 
•  Settlement for securities’ payments, 
including delivery versus payment 
(DvP) 
•  Central depositories for government 
bonds 
•  Supervisory oversight 
•  Continuous linked settlement (CLS) 
system for foreign exchange 
transactions 
•  Standards for fees (to make cross-
border fees the same as national 
fees) 
•  European Banking Association 
(EBA) 
•  Committee of European Bank 
Supervisors (CEBS) 
•  Systemically important payments 
systems (SIPS) 
•  Enforcement (decentralized) 
•  Role of central bank money 
•  TARGET2-Securities 
•  Servicing of long-term 
instruments 
o  Large value payments 
o  Bond Depository 
o  Repos 
o  Credit transfers  
•  Securities Settlement Systems 
(SSS) 
•  Standardization of instruments 
•  Legal framework and oversight 
(cooperation with IOSCO) 
•  Stock exchanges oversight 
•  Securitization 
•  SPV legislation 
•  Oversight of fiscal situations 
(national risk premia have 
sharply narrowed) 
•  Inflation targeting (inflation 
premium has narrowed) 
 
•  Single European Payment Area (SEPA) 
credit transfer 
•  SEPA direct debit 
•  SEPA credit and debit card framework. 
•  PEACH (Pan-European Automated 
Clearing House)³ 
 
¹ A clearing system for large euro transactions throughout euro area to support transmission of money market instruments 
throughout the banking system. A new system, TARGET2 with a centralized processing platform, was introduced in 2008. 
² A multilateral netting system sponsored by the European Banking Association with 71 clearing banks. End-of-day settlement is 
through TARGET. The system includes a liquidity pool at the ECB and a loss sharing agreement. 
³ STEP2 is an EBA sponsored PEACH owned by EBA Clearing Corp. Payments are made in batches. Gross settlement in Euro 
I, with unsettled payments returned. Settlement in future will use TARGET2. 
Source: Authors’ compilation ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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This integration is a sign of the EMU’s success. Furthermore, Ehrmann et al. (2007)
13
To support macroeconomic convergence and stability, European authorities moved toward 
more intensive policy coordination and the strengthening of national institutions through 
strong regulatory oversight. These actions, although indirect, create a system of strong 
national institutions within the regional framework that facilitated cross-border investment 
and market integration.
 found 
that the creation of the union fostered significant integration of financial markets, creating 
significant improvements in the functioning of financial markets with the convergence in the 
levels and co-movements of long-term sovereign bonds, in bond yield responses to common 
shocks, and in long-term inflation expectations built into bond yields toward the rates of the 
countries with lowest inflation expectations. The integration of financial markets in the Euro 
area has brought down and stabilized bond yields by eliminating exchange rate risk and 
creating confidence that the common monetary policy will achieve low inflation throughout 
the union. Further contributing to the convergence are three additional elements integral to 
the European economic environment: general macroeconomic convergence and stability, 
government fiscal restraint, and financial sector stability.  
14
                                                  
13 See also Baele et al. (2004) and Hartmann et al. (2007) 
  
14 As examples, the Euro area places strong limitations on the ratios of national fiscal deficits and national debt to 
GDP. The Maastricht Treaty specifies that deficits and government debt cannot exceed 3% and 60% of GDP, 
respectively. The Growth and Stability Pact provides sanctions for countries that violate these limits. Also, the 
importance of a strong and stable financial system to support monetary policy operations and to contribute to 
strong economic growth was recognized. These factors, even though decentralized, contributed to clear 
Box 3: Loan Guarantee Instrument for Trans-European Transport Network 
Projects (LGTT) 
This box provides an example of an innovative program to support the financing of 
European infrastructure. The LGTT guarantee program of the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and European Commission facilitates greater participation of the private sector in the 
Trans-European Transport Network Infrastructure (TEN-T). Networks cover transportation, 
energy, and communications. The LGTT deals with the specific issue of guaranteeing 
servicing in the initial phases of a project’s operations.  
Under the LGTT, the EIB incurs greater risk than in its normal lending. It backs stand-by 
facilities (SBF) sold by lenders to borrowers that can cover servicing needs during the first 
years of a project. The EIB and European Community (EC) each contribute equally in order 
to back up guarantees sold by banks providing infrastructure funding. The banks receive 
fee income for selling the guarantee, but because the guarantee substantially enhances 
the quality of the credit, the bank should be able to offer significantly cheaper financing to 
the borrower for the project. The reduction in risk and lower borrowing costs both will 
support increased infrastructure finance.  
Once a project is online, the borrower can draw on the SBF during the first five years if 
needed to ensure payment of the senior line of credit. Payments of principal, interest, and 
interest accruals are covered. The SBF is funded by the creditor bank. If the creditor bank 
calls on the LGTT, the EIB makes payments and becomes a subordinated creditor on the 
project. The EIB claims are subordinate to senior credits, but superior to equity. Several 
options are provided to service the EIB claim after the senior credit obligations are fulfilled.  
Source: European Investment Bank (2008) ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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3.1.2. European Development Banking 
Although strong financial markets in Europe enable capital markets to finance much of the 
infrastructure requirements, Europe has a number of programs to provide more direct 
funding of priority infrastructure, with emphasis on supporting funding in poorer regions or 
areas with special needs. Box 3 illustrates one innovative program to guarantee loans to 
support transportation infrastructure development. The European efforts show that even in a 
region with ample capital market funding, special efforts are needed to directly provide 
lending for infrastructure or to provide a range of enhancements to investors to prompt their 
investment. Another broad conclusion is that great flexibility and use of sophisticated 
financial engineering techniques are required to construct financial incentive packages that 
make infrastructure projects attractive to potential investors. Extending the European model 
to Asia suggests that both an efficient regional integrated market and continuing official 
assistance are needed to support infrastructure development. 
If similar approaches were attempted in Asia, new, well-capitalized institutional 
arrangements may be needed to emulate the results achieved in Europe, and continuing 
sources of concessional funding will be needed to cover the costs of incentives and 
guarantees. Also, Asian development institutions can—as is done in Europe—serve as a 
source of technical expertise and assistance in building local bond markets. The importance 
of development banking and concessional incentives is likely to be especially important over 
the next several years because of the current crisis in financial markets, which has made 
many investors hesitant to make commitments. 
3.1.3. Relevance of the European Financial Integration Program for Asia 
The EMU places strong emphasis on development and integration of the financial markets, 
which may hold lessons for how markets should develop in Asia to support infrastructure 
finance and support financial market efficiency in general. What lessons can be drawn for 
Asia from the EMU experience? 
Foremost is the aggressive nature of the programs to integrate financial markets in Europe. 
The efforts are explicitly tied to promoting innovation and competitiveness for the financial 
sector and to support the general economy. Improvements in the financial sector are seen 
as directly contributing to the productivity and competitiveness of Europe in the world 
economy. Asian financial systems are starting from a less competitive position and will need 
to make continuing improvements to not fall further behind.  
The European system also directly addresses the diverse risks that can inhibit cross-border 
investment through the introduction of the euro, which eliminates currency risks in cross-
border transactions. In Asia, by contrast, infrastructure projects denominated in national 
currencies have currency risks affecting (1) investors via loss on investments denominated 
in a foreign currency; (2) servicing costs of projects that increase if the national currency 
depreciates, and (3) cross-border projects where a relative exchange rate change for one 
country could jeopardize the project. The long-term nature of infrastructure investment 
increases the probability of experiencing such exchange rate risks. Europe, through its wide 
range of oversight, market-building efforts, and policy lending and guarantees, is also 
effectively addressing other key risks including country risk, default risk, interest rate risk, 
and traffic risk (the danger that start-up traffic is insufficient to service debts). 
Moreover, within the integrated European system, effective oversight of individual member 
countries through review of macroeconomic and fiscal policies is used to promote and 
achieve the benefits of integration and avoid possible collective destabilization. Asia is also 
slowly working to build and expand its economic oversight and policy dialog systems. The 
                                                                                                                                                     
lessening of national risk in the bond markets, and fostered an environment conducive to cross-border 
investment. ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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recent strengthening of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
15 and the recommendations of ADB 
Institutes’ (ADBI) capital flows management project
16
An enforcement arm in the Euro area makes member countries abide by strict rules 
governing individual country economic and fiscal policies, which are embodied in their 
convergence indicators, to create conditions conducive to overall macroeconomic and fiscal 
stability. Such a transnational enforcement tool does not exist in Asia. An alternative would 
be to develop a set of Asian convergence indicators that would be published, thus using 
market discipline through disclosure as a tool to promote greater convergence. 
 are clear steps in the right direction 
that hopefully will be further advanced. Potentially, an Asian financial market oversight 
system or Asian Financial Markets Stability Forum could contribute to stronger and less 
volatile financial markets for Asia. 
Europe applies many common standards and codes by regulation, but they often represent 
the local application of internationally accepted standards, such as those in the fields of 
accounting, banking supervision, or payments systems. An alternative for Asia would be to 
promote and support regional adoption of international standards and codes, or adoption 
and establishment of a common Asian standard and codes. Asian adoption of international 
standards is largely done locally, and although Asia is not at a point where a transnational 
body can create and impose its own standards, more aggressive steps should be taken to 
coordinate across Asian countries to bring all systems in the region individually and 
collectively up to high levels of compliance with international standards. An Asian Financial 
Stability Institution could provide leadership in this regard.
17
Concessionary financing of incentives to promote bond markets would also be needed. This 
could involve developing private insurance firms or a public infrastructure insurance firm to 
cover the various types of insurance or guarantees involved. A major challenge would be to 




Clearing and payments infrastructure development should be a high priority, as it was in 
Europe. The initiatives on clearing systems of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) ministers in the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint appear to have 
advanced well and efforts can be made to move them to the implementation stage.  
 This pan-Asian entity would need to have some sort of oversight 
function of the instruments and entities it insures, and therefore would collaborate with 
securities and insurance supervisors. 
Creating cross-border adjudication mechanisms would also contribute to the success of 
regional integration. This is difficult in the absence of an overarching legal framework as 
exists in  Europe, but wherever possible common codes and documentation should be 
developed. This convergence is being pursued aggressively in relation to trade and customs 
documentation, and a similar emphasis in the financial sphere would be welcome.
19
                                                  
15 CMI was created in May 2000 by ASEAN+3 finance ministers in response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
using the ASEAN+3 framework to expand the ASEAN Swap Arrangement and establish bilateral swap and 
repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN+3 countries (Henning 2002). 
 A legal 
working group could be created (as was done in Europe) to explore areas of convergence in 
a legal framework to support financial market development. 
16 For details see Kawai and Lamberte (2008). 
17 One of the first tasks of the FSF set up by the G-10 countries was to survey the range of international 
standards and codes relevant for international financial stability. Twelve codes were identified as priorities for 
international implementation; a larger number of codes were identified as important, but less pressing. 
18 One option for creation of such a pool is to link contributions to the pool with redirected flows from SWFs 
toward inward regional investment, or other efforts to manage capital flows associated with the SWFs.  
19 ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia) is a research body that conducts policy analysis 
and other research related to East Asian economic integration) will conduct research in this area. It was 
announced on March 4, 2008, in Tokyo that ERIA would work on a blueprint to make East Asia the largest 
business space in the world through harmonization of practices across countries, logistics improvements, and 
removal of impediments to cross-border trade in goods and services. ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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3.1.4. Lessons for Asia 
The listing of programs and experiences in the previous subsections indicates the 
seriousness of the European effort to promote a high degree of integration of national 
financial markets within the EMU. Many gains in efficiency are envisioned and cuts in costs 
of maintaining separate financial markets have been estimated by the ECB to be equal to 
several percent of GDP. Direct actions were taken to strengthen integration and the common 
overarching legal and institutional framework also contributed importantly. 
Such results are desirable goals for Asia as well in its efforts to promote financing for 
infrastructure development. The European experience shows that creating the best situation 
for Asia, where it could use its vast savings for regional infrastructure development, would 
involve eliminating barriers and frictions in cross-border financial flows so that funds move to 
where they are most productive, reducing currency-risk for cross-border finance through 
policy dialog and recommendations that effectively reduce exchange rate volatility between 
the Asian currencies, creating stable inflation expectations to eliminate inflation premiums in 
national bond issues, and reducing national risk premiums embedded in national bond 
prices. This would involve both reduction in sovereign risk due to poor government fiscal 
management and a reduction in general country bond premiums by building expectations of 
general macroeconomic and financial sector stability. 
Providing access for all national investment projects to deep and liquid markets so that there 
is price discovery, competitive pricing, limited volatility, a range of tenors, and comparable 
financing costs for infrastructure development in each country would also be needed. 
Achieving this would imply that investors and borrowers throughout Asia would have 
unrestricted access to regional financial centers, with a collateral system and surety of cross-
border settlement, as such liquidity can be generated only in larger, concentrated market 
centers or through internet trading. 
Another necessary component would be the building of comparable market indices. The 
yield curves of separate Asian financial markets should begin to converge over time and a 
broad range of maturities should be available in order to most effectively encourage cross-
border and regional investment. 
The aforementioned tasks add up to a heavy agenda, but it is one that Asia should seriously 
consider, because in addition to supporting infrastructure investment, such initiatives would 
increase policy effectiveness, create more effective markets that support growth, save costs, 
and, importantly, create a financial system that could be more competitive in relation to 
financial markets in Europe and America. Promoting financial market integration and bond 
market development has gained increasing traction because of the need to rebalance Asian 
economies and increase the use of regional savings to support Asian investment priorities. 
Also, there is a need to build effective and resilient financial markets that open up a wider 
range of funding options and provide greater overall financial stability. 
4.  ADDRESSING ASIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING 
GAP 
4.1. Countering the Financial and Economic Turmoil 
In addition to the major challenges of financing infrastructure for future growth and improving 
the lives of over two billion people, Asian and Pacific countries are facing headwinds from 
the ongoing global financial and economic turmoil. The turmoil makes raising needed funds 
more difficult, private sector investment is threatened in the short term and public finance is 
more difficult. But it also increases the importance of infrastructure investment. If private 
flows of credit for infrastructure decline, governments and MDBs can look to infrastructure 
investments for stable, long-term, and countercyclical investments. Also, the need for ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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infrastructure services as part of the social safety net in hard times might make it an even 
more important priority. Thus, the crisis may change the nature of the challenges in building 
infrastructure networks, but the needs for infrastructure are as, if not more, important than 
ever. For example, the stimulus package announced by PRC in 2009 totaling US$586 billion 
had important infrastructure components—rural infrastructure, roads, energy, railroads, and 
airports. A package announced in 2008 planned to spend US$292 billion  for railway 
development alone. Moreover, components of the package dealing with social welfare, such 
as education and health care, are likely to include an infrastructure component in the form of 
construction of new facilities (IFCE 2009; FAITC 2009).  
The global turmoil and economic slowdown will hurt the finances of Asian and Pacific 
countries. If exports drop and economic activity slows, total savings in the region will fall, 
government tax revenues will decline, and additional expenditure for social security is likely. 
Funding for infrastructure will face stiffer competition from such other needs. At the same 
time, global investors see their investable funds decrease, leading to drops in capital inflows 
for portfolio investments and direct investment, and possibly shifts in capital outflows.  
However, the special properties of infrastructure as long-term, steady investments that can 
offer investors lucrative returns make it suitable for countercyclical investment. Governments 
and multilateral lenders should accelerate infrastructure investment (compatible with overall 
economic fundamentals) as a countercyclical tool and support long-term economic activity. 
The returns on such investment will support future economic growth when conditions begin 
to improve.  Moreover, there is potential to continue drawing in private investment from 
institutions, such as pension funds, that need outlets for long-term investments and, with the 
proper incentives and prospects for good, long-term returns, infrastructure investment may 
be seen as a favored investment in turbulent times. Additionally, the global crisis has 
significantly affected Asia’s exports to advanced economies. Investing Asian savings for 
Asian regional connectivity can assist in rebalancing Asia’s growth from  high export 
dependency on advanced economies to enhanced regional demand and consumption 
through increased intraregional trade and cross-border investment.  
4.2. Utilizing Asian Savings for Asian Infrastructure 
While a large financing gap for infrastructure development and maintenance does exist, 
Asian economies have huge savings and surpluses. At present, Asian savings are heavily 
invested in developed countries in safe, but low yielding, securities, such as US treasury 
bills. At the same time, due to underdeveloped local capital markets much Asian savings are 
invested in non-productive sectors, such as real estate or stock market speculation. This has 
created a global imbalance through financing advanced economies’ consumption with cheap 
money supplied from huge Asian savings.  
To attract these savings into investments in productive sectors, there is a need to develop 
indigenous financial markets, particularly a strong bond market, as well as appropriate and 
innovative financial instruments. Furthermore, innovative instruments and incentives will be 
needed to create bankable projects and attract private sector participation. The following 
section makes recommendations about how Asian savings might be refocused to serve 
Asian infrastructure needs. These recommendations will draw on the earlier discussions on 
market integration initiatives in Europe, the potential to use Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) 
resources for infrastructure investment, and the possible role of Islamic finance in 
infrastructure investment. 
Not addressed in this paper is a critical issue of the sequencing of changes to bolster 
financial market integration. The question is whether financial market integration in Asia is 
best achieved in stages. The stronger and financially more sophisticated economies could 
achieve integration first, with other economies following. A complex mix of technical and 
political factors will affect this decision. However, there is serious concern that those left out 
are increasingly uncompetitive and once left out are soon forgotten. This study has taken the ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
 
15 
view that whatever system of infrastructure financing is developed, it must address the 
needs of the poorer regions. There are several options that could help fill the significant gap 
between infrastructure demand and current levels of infrastructure financing, both 
institutional and instrumental. Table 2 presents various options for infrastructure financing in 
Asia. 
Table 2: Summary of Options for Infrastructure Financing  
Reserve Bank of 
Asia 
 
•  Combines functions of a reserve bank and an infrastructure financing bank 
•  Authorized capital of about US$300 billion (10% paid-in capital) 




•  MDBs and BDBs have an important role to play in reducing gaps in funding when private sector funds do not 
meet financing needs 
•  ADB has been a reliable funder of a large and broad variety of development projects in Asia, including cross-
border infrastructure 
•  MDBs can both create bankable projects and mobilize long-term funding through capital markets, explicit 
guarantees, and special co-financing arrangements 
Local Currency Bond 
Markets (ABMI) 
•  Local-currency bond issues minimize currency and maturity mismatches 
•  Promote use of Asian savings and foreign exchange reserves in infrastructure 
•  MDBs can contribute by issuing local currency bonds and undertaking currency swaps 









•  Either a new specialized investment bank (IFB) or a new Asian Infrastructure Fund (AIF) administered by MDBs, 
particularly ADB 
•  Intermediate the use of financial assets for infrastructure and other development projects 
•  Provide infrastructure loans and collaborate with the banking community, co-financing and guaranteeing private 
investment financing 
•  Direct Asian savings to infrastructure development and develop expertise in cross-border infrastructure bond 
finance 
•  Negotiation, planning, and implementation of a large new institution will be lengthy and less cost-effective 
Regional Companies 
for Financing 
Specific Sectors  
 
•  Finance and manage regional projects for specific sectors 
•  Can also raise funds from capital markets through equity or infrastructure bonds 
•  May take the form of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) 





•  Initiatives on infrastructure development in Asia, such as the GMS, ASEAN, SAARC, CAREC, and SASEC 




•  Exchange rate and inflation guarantees are key risks that guarantees can cover 
•  Credit risk and servicing risk from low initial infrastructure traffic can also be covered 
•  GDP-linked bonds lower debt service payments in times of economic distress, helping governments avoid default 




•  Configure financial packages to meet requirements of Islamic investors 
•  Develop individual and community-level instruments that provide basic banking services to the large Asian Islamic 
communities 
•  Create an official regional Islamic Financing Bank to provide overhead services to local banking operations 
Public-Private 
Partnerships 
•  Physical infrastructure requires large investments suited to private sector cooperation  
•  Potential for private financing of up to perhaps 30% of total investment needs 
Asian Infrastructure 
Currency Unit (AICU) 
denominated bonds 
•  Focus of AICU is to reduce exchange rate risk 
•  AICU is an accounting mechanism equal to a weighted measure of Asian currencies, and based on de facto 
relative stability between Asian currencies 
•  Weights may depend on factors such as GDP, international reserves, or the basket of currencies used in a 
specific infrastructure project ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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4.3. Financing Institutions for Regional Infrastructure Investment in 
Asia 
4.3.1 Pan-Asian and Subregional Infrastructure Funds 
It is proposed that a series of special funds be set up that will support financing projects at 
both national and regional levels by identifying, prioritizing, designing, and then promoting 
the development of infrastructure projects. There is a need for a pan-Asian and/or a series of 
subregional infrastructure funds dedicated to cross-border projects to enhance Asia’s 
connectivity and move toward the creation of a seamless Asia. These can be best thought of 
as multi-donor platforms that provide good means to collect and administer funds received 
and then have flexibility to move them according to suitable priorities and sequencing. 
Such funds could be administered in a variety of ways and it is not necessary to set up new 
institutions, though that is always a possibility. For example, ADB could be the administrator 
of all or some of the funds as trust funds, a participant with other partners, or an investor in a 
new entity. Whatever the structure (which is a policy issue) it is important that the funds 
perform certain important functions in support of infrastructure development and financing.  
The first need is identifying, prioritizing, designing, and promoting the development of 
infrastructure projects. The quality of this process is critical because the goal is to produce a 
list of well-designed, bankable projects that accurately describe the benefit, costs, and risks 
of projects in ways that make clear how they are good bets for large public and private 
investments. These funds can be supported by creating a special joint grant facility by ADB 
and other MDBs and bilateral contributors, such as the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to help identify 
and prepare bankable cross-border projects. These funds need to provide grants and 
concessional financing to Asian countries that have low-incomes and low technical 
capacities to reduce asymmetric costs and distribute benefits among participating countries.  
These funds might include private sector participation, which could be necessary to obtain 
adequate funding. Such private sector participation may also be designed to provide access 
to technical or industry expertise of the private sector, such as creating consortiums of firms 
in rail development or port logistics. The interface with the private sector would help in 
identifying and designing bankable cross-border projects and in negotiating with 
governments and potential private investors sectors. Finally, the fund would need to consider 
how to provide necessary incentives to countries (particularly low income ones) to agree to 
and implement cross-border projects. One option is to provide concessional funds to low-
income developing countries who may not receive proportionate benefits compared to 
middle-income countries participating in a regional project.  
4.3.2. Reserve Bank of Asia 
Agarwala (2008) proposed the establishment of a Reserve Bank of Asia (RBA) to address 
the infrastructure financing gap of Asia, both at national and regional levels, and also to 
serve as a type of regional central bank. The RBA would have an authorized capital of about 
US$300 billion, 10% of which could be in the form of paid up capital. The bank would have 
authority to borrow from the central banks of Asia about 10% of their foreign exchange 
reserves at the rate of return on 30-year US Treasury Bills and to invest them in global 
equity indices.
20
                                                  
20 The source of funding of the RBA is a critical variable in its financing and mode of operation. If funds are taken 
from official reserve assets, then the RBA must hold the funds in a liquid form in which they are readily usable 
in case of balance of payments need of the participating countries. Also, if the national contributors have a 
negative carrying cost on the contributions, it is unclear why the net profit from RBA investments should accrue 
to the RBA and not the countries. (Conversely, if the pooling of funds by the RBA permits countries to hold 
 The bank would utilize the profits earned to promote infrastructure in a 
public-private partnership mode.  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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The RBA would also be authorized to act like a regional monetary fund or central bank. It 
would have authority to provide balance of payments support to member countries when 
needed and to issue an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) as a parallel (co-circulating) currency 
that would be freely convertible internationally. These aspects are not very different from the 
concepts of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) and the European Currency 
Unit (ECU) set up in Europe in the 1970’s.  
The option of creating a co-circulating currency, as proposed by Agarwala (2008), is 
appealing in many respects, especially if it benefits economies undergoing financial turmoil 
that have weak and depreciating currencies. Other such proposals have been made, and in 
a sense the European Currency Unit (ECU) was almost a type of co-circulating unit of value 
that was used for public and private financial instruments in Europe. The Asian Infrastructure 
Currency Unit (AICU) proposed later on in this study has potential to develop into a co-
circulating currency. However, there are many challenging operational aspects, such as solid 
funding of the alternative central bank, clearing and settlement, sharing of seigniorage, and 
not destabilizing regular currencies and monetary policies. 
The creation of the RBA, combining functions of a reserve bank and an infrastructure 
financing bank like ADB, is without precedent and may not be feasible. In the past, ADB had 
performed the functions of the proposed RBA when it provided quick adjustment loans to 
some Asian crisis-affected countries, such as the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), but 
this was far more limited than the arrangement conceived by Agarwala (2008). Moreover, 
creating a formal regional central banking system parallel to national central banks, each 
with their own monetary policies and exchange rates, is challenging. It may be a better 
strategy to keep the investment aspects separate (handled by an expanded ADB that 
administers a new Asia infrastructure fund), and have a separate monetary institute that can 
promote a long-term financial integration program. 
4.3.3. Multilateral and Bilateral Development Institutions  
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have an important role to play in reducing funding 
gaps if private sector funds do not meet financing needs. MDBs can also facilitate regional 
cooperation for the provision of regional public goods, such as sharing services and 
resources among neighboring countries through cross-border collective action and 
coordination. Through financing regional infrastructure, MDBs can assist countries in 
achieving the full potential of cross-border trade and investment, as well as improving their 
competitiveness in the region by reducing trade costs, especially cross-border costs, by 
helping to improve transport and logistics systems, procedures, and protocols and supply 
chain management. 
MDBs, such as ADB and the World Bank, are already playing an important role in 
infrastructure development by creating bankable projects and mobilizing long-term funds 
through capital markets and arranging co-financing. Bilateral development banks or 
agencies like JICA and JBIC, are also playing  a useful role, and similar bilateral 
development banks in major Asian economies, such as PRC, Singapore, Korea, and India, 
can also contribute to the provision of financing facilities. To reduce large financing gaps, 
MDBs need to expand their roles in mobilizing funding, particularly in arranging co-financing 
and providing loan and financing guarantees. Moreover, MDBs can create appropriate and 
innovative financial instruments for PPP projects to encourage private sector investment and 
can also promote further integration and enhancement of Asian financial market efficiency, 
liquidity, and depth, with adherence to international and regional standard best practices. 
This will enhance cross-border flows of capital and promote efficient infrastructure 
investment utilizing Asia’s huge savings. 
                                                                                                                                                     
lower balances of reserve assets, it could permit the countries to make more profitable use of their funds.) If 
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By acting jointly as money banks, knowledge banks, capacity builders, and honest brokers, 
MDBs can continue to support Asia’s infrastructure development. Utilizing their AAA ratings 
and ability to raise funds in international capital markets at and lending funds with low 
spreads, MDBs should be active in providing loans and guarantees and catalyzing private 
sector financing. These institutions can also continue to be a key source of policy and 
technical advice, assisting in building the “soft infrastructure” (i.e., legal, regulatory, policy, 
customs, and procedural components) in member country governments and regional 
institutions. Finally, MDBs can play a key role coordinating multiple stakeholders for regional 
integration  and infrastructure development. ADB’s Regional Cooperation and Integration 
(RCI) Strategy passed in October 2006, for example, promotes: (i) cross-border 
infrastructure and associated soft infrastructure, especially greater cross-border physical 
connectivity and (ii) regional cooperation in the provision of regional public goods and 
avoidance of regional public “bads”, (such as pollution and Green House Gas emissions). 
These kinds of roles and responsibilities by MDB activities in the region should be further 
enhanced to better facilitate regional infrastructure development and financing. 
Asia needs to funnel its massive savings into “bankable” projects, primarily through bond 
market development and better use of savings and foreign reserves. In view of this, it is 
important to continue developing Asia’s bond market (through the ABMI) to improve regional 
financial intermediation. MDBs can contribute to this process by providing further technical 
and research assistance to ABMI Working Groups and Focal Group of the ABM Initiative, 
stimulating market activities by issuing prime name credit papers and local currency bonds, 
promoting transparency and information dissemination, and contributing to policy dialogue. 
In the past, ADB in particular has been a reliable funder of a large and broad variety of 
development projects in Asia, including cross-border infrastructure. It has historically offered 
traditional financing and other types of assistance at competitive rates, in the form of loans, 
equity financing, various financial risk guarantees, syndication arrangements, and technical 
assistance. More recently, it has also begun financing projects through the use of local 
currency financing, finance for trade facilitation, securitization, mortgage financing, and 
servicing of non-performing or under-performing financial assets (ADB 2008a). Clearly, there 
is room for greater assistance of MDBs in the development of cross-border infrastructure, 
either as sole investors or in partnerships with other institutions. Recently, ADB’s capital has 
tripled to $165 billion, which will facilitate mobilizing additional funds for infrastructure 
investment and poverty reduction in Asia (ADB 2009b).  
MDBs can also promote projects that could be considered as “Aid for Trade”, perhaps in 
coordination with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Aid for Trade, according to the 
WTO, is donor financing from developed and developing countries that is invested in soft 
infrastructure, such as trade-promoting infrastructure and assistance projects, including aid 
for supply chains and industrial (i.e., capacity) development. In 2005, a total of US$15 billion 
was committed to Aid for Trade by highly developed countries, including US$10 billion from 
Japan (ADB 2007). Such support continues to be forthcoming and assisting in structuring 
deals and projects so they meet the provisions of Aid for Trade programs is of great 
importance and is another way that MDBs can play an active role in obtaining increased 
financing for cross-border infrastructure. 
4.3.4. Local Currency Bond Markets  
The development of local currency bond markets is a key method to reduce foreign currency 
risk for borrowers and should be promoted to meet growing infrastructure financing needs. 
Developing these markets would also minimize currency and maturity mismatches, which 
were among the major factors behind the severe financial crisis in 1997–1998. Currency 
mismatch problems arise if countries borrow in foreign currency to finance infrastructure 
projects and the revenues are earned is in local currency. On the other hand, if countries 
borrow foreign currency for the short-term or medium-term, but the cash flow lags after the ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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completion of the project, there could be maturity mismatch problems. This is a demand risk 
problem that can be addressed through official foreign currency guarantees. 
Since the 1997–1998 financial crisis, Asian economies have undertaken considerable efforts 
to further develop and strengthen institutions and market infrastructure to enhance the 
growth of local currency bond markets. In 2003, finance ministers from ASEAN plus Japan, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Korea introduced the ABMI. Several working 
groups were established to develop the infrastructure, regulations, and best practices of the 
local currency bond markets. Such an initiative can promote the utilization of Asia’s savings 
and increasing foreign exchange reserves within the region, particularly for use in 
infrastructure development. The creation of standing working groups to promote the 
development of various aspects of financial market infrastructure is a strong step in the right 
direction and should continue to be aggressively pursued. 
At the Madrid ADB annual meeting in May 2008, the commitment to the ABMI was renewed 
with a focus on promoting local currency bond issuance, facilitating demand for the bonds, 
improving the regulatory framework, and improving the market infrastructure. Efforts are 
voluntary, but each country is tasked to make periodic self-assessments in meeting the 
ABMI goals. All these steps, which are at the national level of integration with some regional 
oversight, appear to be moving in the right direction, but it remains to be seen how effective 
the approach will be. 
MDBs, as banks with continuing involvement in capital markets, can play an important role in 
raising long-term funds for financing infrastructure projects, contributing to building market 
liquidity and depth and issuing local currency bonds by undertaking currency swaps. The 
ADB has been integral in developing Asia’s bond market by providing technical and research 
assistance to ABMI Working Groups and the Focal Group of the ABMI; stimulating market 
activities by issuing prime name credit papers; promoting transparency and information 
dissemination; contributing to policy dialogue; and issuing local currency bonds.
21
In order to attract private investors for local currency infrastructure bonds, the return should 
be attractive and high rated. According to a report by Asia Bond Monitor, the policy 
challenges for the development of a stable, deep, and strong bond market include:  
 
“(i)  bolster investor confidence by strengthening legal protection and thus certainty, 
improve standards of corporate governance and transparency, and adhere to 
international accounting standards; 
(ii)  reduce constraints to market entry, investment, and encourage investor diversity 
to promote greater demand for local currency bonds;  
(iii) develop derivative and swap markets to broaden the investor base, increase 
market liquidity, and allow a wider dispersal of risk; and  
(iv) strengthen broader arrangements for regulatory oversight and regional 
cooperation in the areas of information-sharing and in coordinated actions to 
maintain financial stability” (ADB 2008b: 1-2). 
4.3.5. Asian Infrastructure Financing Bank or Fund 
An  important issue to be examined is whether Asia should establish a new, specialized 
investment bank for infrastructure financing similar to the European Investment Bank or the 
Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento, or CAF). This bank 
                                                  
21 ADB has issued several local currency bonds. In October 2005, ADB launched its fifth market-opening 
transaction P2.5 billion (US$45.37 million) peso-denominated bonds to develop Asia’s local currency bond 
markets. Starting in early 2004, ADB undertook five other market-opening transactions in the region's local 
currency bond markets in India, Malaysia, PRC, the Philippines, and Thailand. In 2007, the ADB issued local 
currency bonds in Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Philippines; and Singapore. Moreover, according to 
Asia Bond Monitor (2008), emerging East Asia’s local currency (LCY) bonds outstanding increased at a very 
rapid annual 21% rate in the second half of 2007. Also, LCY government bond markets expanded by 21% in 
2007, primarily due to central bank sterilization and fiscal stimulus. LCY corporate bonds grew by 20% in 2007, 
exhibiting the limited initial impact of the global credit crisis.  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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might serve to intermediate (through deposit facilities, bond issuance, and transactions 
services) the use of the large accumulations of official financial assets for infrastructure and 
other regional and development projects. Another alternative could be a new Asia 
Infrastructure Fund (AIF) which could be managed by ADB. This fund could be dedicated to 
regional infrastructure projects. The new bank or fund may consider issuing liabilities in the 
form of equities and bonds to be contributed by participating countries and multilateral and 
bilateral development banks as well as private sector using some standard measure to 
denominate investments, such as a regional currency basket. The participating countries can 
use a portion of their excess foreign reserve to purchase these bonds.  
There have been previous proposals for establishing either an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) or an Asian Infrastructure Finance Corporation (AIFC). For example, 
in 2007, Kim Hak-Su, executive secretary of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), stated that the region could learn from 
India’s experiences utilizing special purpose vehicles for infrastructure investment. The 
region could authorize an  entity such as AIIB or AIFC to borrow from regional foreign 
exchange reserves and both invest in capital and equity markets globally—using the returns 
to finance regional infrastructure projects—as well as provide direct lending for infrastructure 
financing (UNESCAP 2007). Agarwala (2005) judged that such an Asian Investment Bank 
(AIB) could provide infrastructure loans and collaborate with the banking community in both 
raising and investing resources. It could work with the private sector by co-financing and 
guaranteeing private investment financing. Even if only 50% of Asia’s incremental current 
account surpluses during the next five years are put in these assets, there would be ample 
funding for the huge investment needs in these regional projects. Besides raising funds, this 
institution could also help regional countries address non-financial constraints that 
discourage infrastructure investment by the private sector; these constraints could be 
regulatory barriers, lengthy processes or procedures, and risks involved in long-term and 
large-scale investment (Jayanth 2007).  
However, there would be many disadvantages in setting up a new investment bank. First, 
negotiation, planning, and implementation of a new large institution would be lengthy and 
possibly less cost-effective than using existing institutions. The bank would need to establish 
a credible track record to ensure trust and confidence among member countries and their 
private sectors. Furthermore, the overall cost of borrowing could be higher compared with 
established institutions due to the additional operational cost of the bank and the bank’s 
initial smaller scale of operation and initial lack of the AAA ratings necessary for the bank to 
mobilize funds at a low cost in the international capital market. 
It would also be challenging for a new bank to create an adequate knowledge base and 
expertise comparable to that of existing institutions, which is essential for winning the trust 
and confidence of participating Asian countries. Organizations such as ADB, the World 
Bank, and UNESCAP have solid track records in providing significant assistance for 
infrastructure development in Asia and conceiving and implementing cross-border projects 
under several subregional programs, such as Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), South Asia 
Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC), Brunei Darussalam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines – East ASEAN Growth Area 
(BIMP-EAGA), and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
22
                                                  
22 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC), Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-The Philippines-East 
ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (BIMSTEC). 
. For example, ADB has provided approximately US$83 billion to 
date in infrastructure loans and grant financing in the region, and has strong financial and 
risk management capacity and practices and international-level disclosure standards. The 
resources of these organizations, however, are still limited and would be insufficient to meet 
the entire financing gap (ADB 2009a).  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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In view of the above, an Asian Infrastructure Financing Fund (or a special vehicle fund) could 
be set up under an appropriate governance structure such as an affiliate, subsidiary, or trust 
fund managed by ADB. This fund should have its own resources or capital contributed from 
national governments of major Asian countries. In addition, this fund could intermediate and 
direct Asian savings to infrastructure development and assist in meeting the infrastructure 
investment gap by selling bonds for cross-border infrastructure finance, customizing 
instruments to fit market preferences, and potentially providing guarantees, incentives, and 
concessionary finance. It could also generate additional funds through co-financing from 
other development and financial institutions, SWFs, pension funds, private portfolio 
investments, and special vehicle funds. A portion of major Asian countries’ excess 
international reserves could be utilized initially to set up such a fund. A new institutional 
framework for this fund would allow for more flexible rules, regulations, policies, systems, 
and procedures. This fund could be structured to identify, prioritize, prepare, and facilitate 
financing commercially viable regional infrastructure projects. For making the projects viable, 
the fund needs to provide guarantees against major risks (e.g. political risk, credit risk, and 
refinancing risk) faced by large cross-border projects, as well as grant and concessional 
financing to low-income participating countries. .  
The advantages of this new infrastructure fund would include a more focused mission for 
specialized jobs like cross-border infrastructure financing, and the creation of simpler and 
more efficient systems and procedures, such as the quick processing of loans with few 
conditions that borrowing member countries find difficult to implement and can delay project 
implementation and increase project cost. Also, it would offer better customization and 
sophisticated techniques to meet borrower countries’ needs and the utilization of Asian 
savings for Asian infrastructure in a cost effective manner. ADB/ADBI (2009) has proposed a 
similar Asian Infrastructure Fund.  
4.3.6. Regional Infrastructure Companies for Financing Specific Sectors 
Another alternative could be to create several regional companies that would finance and 
manage regional projects for specific sectors, such as transport (road, railways, seaports 
and airports), energy, and telecommunications. Major Asian economies could invest in these 
companies together, allowing for private sector participation at a later stage. Experts from 
various parts of Asia, and also from outside Asia, could be invited to join these companies. 
These companies could also raise funds from capital markets through equity or infrastructure 
bonds. Special sub-regional infrastructure funds could be created to finance sub-regional 
projects.  
This alternative might take the form of the European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
Company (EADS), which would be jointly owned by Asian governments, public sector 
companies, or both together. An Asian infrastructure group for cross-border infrastructure 
development established akin to the EADS could be owned by Asian governments, relevant 
regional public sectors, and private sector firms with appropriate expertise in the 
infrastructure development. The sale of public shares throughout the region would help 
deepen equity markets and provide a needed outlet for household savings and institutions’ 
investment funds. This group could own subsidiaries specializing in sectors, such as 
transport, energy, and telecommunications. Infrastructure companies need to specialize in a 
sector to earn credibility, and hence sectoral Asian companies (specializing in transport, 
telecommunication, energy, etc.) would need to be established. Subsequently, a significant 
portion of shares could be distributed to the public and employees to  create a good 
governance structure. Multiple locations for operations could be selected depending on 
locations of planned cross-border projects.  
4.3.7. Subregional Infrastructure Funds or Subregional Infrastructure Companies 
There are already several subregional initiatives on infrastructure development in Asia, such 
as GMS, ASEAN, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), CAREC, and ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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SASEC. Special subregional infrastructure funds could be created to finance sub-regional 
projects. Special subregional companies could also be established to manage these 
infrastructure projects. Such subregional institutions could work in a way similar to that 
described in sections 4.3.5 and 4.3.6. Recently, ASEAN has decided to set up an ASEAN 
Infrastructure  Fund through ADB, which in turn is now preparing the fund’s needed 
framework (Nam News Network 2010). It is possible that this fund could initially be 
established by major ASEAN countries utilizing their excess international reserves, and the 
other ASEAN countries would be allowed to join subsequently. Once this ASEAN 
Infrastructure Fund has been created, other major Asian countries could join to create an 
ASEAN+3
23 or an ASEAN+6
24
4.4. Instruments for Financing Asia’s Regional Infrastructure 
 infrastructure fund. This process is similar to the pattern 
observed in the Asian trade integration using ASEAN as a hub and forming the ASEAN+1 
free trade agreement.  
4.4.1. Guaranteed and Linked Bonds 
Infrastructure projects could also be financed through innovative bond structures that would 
include guarantees or enhancements to protect investors in terms of various risks, insulate 
borrowers from adverse changes in servicing costs, and customize issues to fit the specific 
needs of lenders and borrowers. Contemporary financial markets have become quite 
sophisticated in fashioning instruments to cover specific situations and to appeal to different 
classes of borrowers. Where these techniques could be married with availability of 
concessional finance, it could be possible to craft lending instruments that could strongly 
promote economic development. 
Customization could involve enhancing instruments with one or more guarantees, links that 
would provide protection against specific types of risk, or spreading returns and risks to 
better fit the profiles of lenders and borrowers. A wide range of instruments could provide the 
enhancements—direct guarantees or insurance could be used, derivatives like forwards and 
options would be possible, income and expense flows could be capped, income flows could 
be swapped, instruments could be linked to commodity prices or other measures, etc.—
depending on the specific borrowing situation and the sophistication of markets in crafting 
instruments. Types of risks and examples of instruments that could be use to mitigate them 
could include: 
 
Risk  Instrument 
Exchange risk  Exchange rate guarantees; 
Currency Baskets 
Inflation risk  Inflation-linked instruments 
Commodity price risk  Commodity price-linked instruments 
Credit risk  Credit guarantees 
Demand (traffic) risk  Demand (traffic) guarantees 
Economic risk  GDP-linked instruments
25 
                                                  
23 ASEAN+3 is composed of ASEAN member countries plus PRC, Korea, and Japan. 
24 ASEAN+6 is composed of ASEAN+3 plus Australia, New Zealand, and India. 
25 GDP-linked instruments adjust payments to the speed of growth of GDP of the borrowing country. There is a 
growing body of literature recommending the use of GDP-linked bonds. For borrowers, they can lower debt 
service payments in times of economic distress, allowing for greater fiscal policy flexibility and lowering the 
probability of default. For investors, GDP-linked bonds provide opportunities to diversify portfolios and can offer 
high returns if payments are linked to nominal GDP growth. In this latter case, the borrowers are de facto 
protected from real obligations to make higher payments because of the larger size of GDP and also the 
possibility that there is an inflationary component in the higher nominal GDP. 
See, for example: Borensztein and Mauro (2002), Griffith-Jones and Sharma (2006), Miyajima (2006), Schröder 




Financial sophistication would be needed to design and implement the full range of these 
instruments. Cross-border issues would require additional skills to deal with  differing 
institutions, practices, and legal frameworks. Only a limited number of institutions and 
markets could be expected to provide the range of skills required, which could reside both in 
public institutions and private markets. Asian financial market development would benefit 
from the building of such skills at ADB, other Asian public institutions, and also in key 
regional private markets. Infrastructure projects in countries that do not have the skills 
available domestically would have to have ready and cost efficient access to markets where 
they are available. ADB or other regional public institutions could deal directly with projects 
anywhere in the region, but it would also be important to have easy cross-border access to 
private markets in key financial centers within Asia.  
4.4.2. Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Several Asian economies, as well as economies of other regions, have created sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) to hold and invest part of their large holdings of international reserve 
currencies. This subsection examines the potential for SWFs, and other large national pools 
of investable funds such as national pension funds, to invest in Asian infrastructure. The 
specific character of infrastructure investments often fits the investment profile of SWFs. 
Moreover, the global financial crisis has highlighted the usefulness of regional infrastructure 
investment as an important source of stimulus funding as short-  or medium-term 
countercyclical measures, but that also offers high, long-term economic benefits. It will 
describe an important initiative in this regard by ASEAN to set up a regional infrastructure 
fund that will draw on resources similar to SWFs, and which may become a model for use of 
SWFs for infrastructure funding.  
The best source of information on SWFs is the initial report of the International Working 
Group on Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) that presents 24 voluntary Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices (GAPP) for SWFs, called the “Santiago Principles” (IWG 2008).
 26
 “Special purpose investment vehicles or arrangements owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, 
SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and 
employ a  set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial 
assets. SWFs have diverse legal, institutional, and governance structures. They are 
a heterogeneous group, comprising fiscal stabilization funds, savings funds, reserve 
investment corporations, development funds, and pension reserve funds without 
explicit pension liabilities” (IWG 2008: 3). 
 
SWFs are defined by the working group as: 
The formal definition of SWFs excludes foreign currency reserves assets held by monetary 
authorities for traditional balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, state-owned 
enterprises, government employee pension funds, and assets managed for the benefit of 
individuals. These are important exclusions, but for the purposes of this study on a case-by-
case basis the investment profiles of such funds might include infrastructure investments. 
For example, state-owned enterprises might seek infrastructure investments ancillary to their 
main line of business. Thus, these non-SWF pools of investable funds might be approached 
with investment proposals, but they will not be further discussed here.  
Many SWFs segregate funds into accounts separate from countries’ official international 
reserves to generate higher returns and many are explicitly designed to pass wealth to future 
                                                  
26 The IWG was set up as an ad hoc group to determine the principles of conduct for SWF and treatments in host 
countries. The GAPP agreement is an important step forward in understanding the nature of SWFs and making 
them more accountable and transparent, but the code is voluntary and adoption by all SWFs is not assured. 
Work is underway to build on the achievements of the IWG to create a standing body to represent SWFs. See 
also IMF (2008).  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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generations, especially when  the income is derived from exploitation of an expendable 
resource.
 27
In broad terms, three different types of SWFs can be distinguished. Different investment 
strategies and policy perspectives may apply to each type. 
 Although the capital and income from SWFs are intended for strategic or future 
use, the rules to draw on SWFs vary by country and have often not been transparent, 
although application of the GAPP could change that. It has been reported that during the 
crisis a number of SWFs have been tapped as stimulus funds for domestic projects. 
•  Commodity-based SWFs: These SWFs are based on high returns from the 
production of commodities. Strong demand and favorable price movements for a 
commodity, such as oil, can result in rapid accumulations of foreign currency assets. 
These funds are unencumbered assets that are not associated with specific liabilities 
and thus can be freely invested by the SWFs in accordance with their directives. 
Countries with these types of SWFs may create them to isolate funds from the 
domestic economy, use them as stabilization funds to cushion drops in prices, or 
build long-term investment income to support the economy after the resource is 
depleted. The funds might also be domestically invested to help the economy 
diversify, but such investment must avoid destabilizing the economy. 
•  Pension-based SWFs: Some countries create SWFs from funds raised from 
pension or social security contributions (funds with explicit liabilities to individual 
pension holders are excluded). These funds must be invested with a long-term 
perspective and with recognition of the liability to cover future payments. Long-term 
infrastructure investments with stable return profiles fit the investment needs of this 
type of SWF well. 
•  SWFs  for countries with a large current account surplus and large international 
reserve assets. The assets are often acquired due to sterilization of export earnings, 
which creates a liability to the public. PRC and several other Asian economies have 
this type of accumulation of foreign currency assets that can be used to fund SWFs. 
These types of SWFs often play a key role in the macro-financial stance of the 
country and can affect policies on exchange rates, capital flows, inflation, and money 
and credit. The investment strategies of these types of funds must not contradict the 
sterilization policies that led to their creation in the first place, but are otherwise 
flexible. Because this type of SWF is based on an explicit policy configuration, 
changes in the policies (such as an exchange rate appreciation or shifts in national 
absorption) can affect the SWF, including the possibility of slowing or capping the 
SWF’s future growth. These types of SWFs may be constrained from making 
domestic infrastructure investments because they were launched to isolate the funds 
from the domestic economy, but they could do so if it is compatible with balanced 
macroeconomic conditions. However, they might be good sources for regional 
infrastructure funding. 
Table 3 lists 13 Asian and Pacific countries (including Russia) that are often considered to 
have SWFs. The SWFs themselves have different functions and range in size. Estimates of 
the size of assets held by SWFs vary widely, but the Asian SWFs listed below appear to hold 
somewhere between US$700 and US$950 billion, which is about one-third of total assets 
held by the more than 30 SWFs currently operating worldwide. By size of total assets in 
early 2008, the largest SWFs in Asia were in the PRC, Singapore, Russia, and Australia. 
                                                  
27 International reserve assets serve a special purpose to be available for exchange rate policy and to deal with 
balance of payments imbalances. According to the IMF definition of reserves, they must be readily available 
and in a readily convertible currency, SDRs, or monetary gold. The requirement that reserves have high 
liquidity precludes their use for long-term investments, such as those made by SWFs. Countries with reserves 
exceeding balance of payments needs can transfer them to SWFs to allow for their long-term investment. Also, 
income generated on international reserves is usually low (and sometimes negative, net, if reserves are built 
up by issuing high-interest rate liabilities to sterilize the monetary impacts of foreign currency assets held by 
the public). SWFs have the flexibility to invest in higher return assets.  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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Table 3: Selected Asian Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Country  Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Australia   Australian Future Fund 
Azerbaijan   State Oil Fund 
Brunei Darussalem   Brunei Investment Authority 
PRC  China Investment Corporation (CIC) 
Iran   Development Fund 
Kazakhstan   National Fund 
Kiribati   Revenue Equalization Fund 
Korea  Korea Investment Corporation 
Malaysia   Khazanah 
New Zealand   New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
Russia Federation  Oil Stabilization Fund 
Singapore   Government Investment Corporation 
   Temasek 
Timor-Leste   Petroleum Fund 
Viet Nam  State Capital Investment Corporation 
Most SWFs are professionally invested to earn good market returns that exceed the 
earnings on official international reserves, which usually are invested in very safe, low return 
assets. SWFs are typically granted wide latitude in making investments, including in equities. 
Although most SWF investments are in foreign countries, investments within the home 
country or within a region are also common. Investments at home can be made for national 
strategic development purposes; for example, the Libyan SWF directly makes domestic 
infrastructure investments (IWG 2008).  As noted previously, the appropriate investment 
strategy can differ depending on the type of SWF funding, the associated liability, and the 
public policy goals of the SWF.  
The GAPP makes it clear that there is great diversity in SWF investment strategies. 
Domestic investments are made by some SWFs, and some SWFs may address social, 
environmental, or other factors in their investment policy. Whenever investments are made 
on such grounds, the GAPP recommend that the policies should be publicly disclosed (IWG 
2008).  
Infrastructure projects appear to fit the investment profile of many SWFs because of their 
size, long-term tenor, competitive returns, ability to diversify portfolios with cyclically or 
financial market uncorrelated investments, and because they often have investment 
guarantees. Moreover, the current turmoil in global financial markets may shrink other 
investment opportunities and increase the competitiveness of infrastructure investments.  
Also, a point made strongly in the GAPP is that investment strategies must respect 
macroeconomic and macro financial limitations; they must not contribute to overheating of 
the domestic economy or contradiction of sterilization, exchange rate, or capital flows 
policies. SWF activities can affect domestic fiscal and monetary conditions and therefore 
should fit within a country’s overall macroeconomic policy framework and coordinated with 
domestic authorities.  Several of the Asian SWFs have activities that involve exchanges 
between domestic and foreign currencies, which may affect monetary conditions, exchange ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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rates, and domestic demand and that must be subjected to regular macroeconomic policy 
oversight as national macroeconomic or financial policies would be affected.
28
Currently available information about the activities and governance of SWFs is still limited, 
but has improved in recent years. SWFs that implement the GAPP would provide 
substantially more information, reporting in line with host country or international standards 
and improving both internal and external reporting, and such SWFs would provide regulatory 
and statistical information for use in macroeconomic accounts. 
 
Several prominent SWFs have made public statements regarding their goals and policies. 
They clearly seek to assure the public and officials in host countries that investment 
decisions have been based on commercial considerations only and that there should be no 
fear of political or other motivations. Overwhelmingly, the investment goals are to produce 
long-term gains, competitive with market returns or better. Two SWFs pay regular dividends 
to the government, two invest in accordance with guidance from their governments on the 
types  or allocations of investments and the situation with the others in each case is 
uncertain.  
The information in these statements provides some clues about how SWFs may respond 
regarding possible investments in infrastructure. Overall, using SWFs to induce substantial 
investment in infrastructure is challenging because this type of investment is still unfamiliar 
to most SWFs and their investment managers. It does not fit into a seeming preference for 
more arms-length investment, and may not generate the higher returns that SWFs are 
seeking. However, the long run tenor of infrastructure investment and the opportunity to 
diversify and hedge cyclical exposures may make it an attractive investment for some SWFs. 
Investments packaged with exchange rate or traffic guarantees could be especially 
interesting for SWFs. 
SWFs could become a regular source of funding for infrastructure within the home country 
and within the region, but because of the limited information about them and the diverse 
objectives of SWFs, it is hard to be specific about under what conditions and how much they 
would be willing to invest in infrastructure projects.
29
First, planning for infrastructure development should involve a serious commitment to 
attempt to tap SWFs to support Asian cross-border infrastructure investment. This type of 
commitment should be initiated early in the project planning process and should involve 
SWFs within the affected region and outreach by organizations such as ADB to SWFs in 
other Asian countries or in the Middle-East. This early interaction with SWFs will allow 
customization of financial packages to fit the preferences of SWFs. Also, the strong profit 
motivation of SWFs will require that infrastructure investment proposals provide market 
returns or better. Attracting investment by SWFs may require extension of enhancements or 
guarantees by governments, development banks, etc. to ensure that investments are secure 
and profitable.  
 Although there are major uncertainties, 
a strategy for drawing on their resources for infrastructure investment is proposed below.  
SWFs often are expected to invest to support national strategic economic development 
priorities, so it could be argued that infrastructure investment is a natural area of investment 
that supports the strategic development strategies for the country. SWFs could adopt a 
strategy to create mixed and hedged portfolios, along the lines of commercial practice, of 
which part will be in long-term infrastructure investments. Here, a target of 10% investment 
                                                  
28 By extension, regional, cross-border, or international investments by SWFs can also have macroeconomic 
ramifications on the host countries that need to be considered by the host country or by regional authorities. 
29 For purposes of how SWFs could support infrastructure finance, precise definitions of the type of SWF are not 
needed. Various types of large state funds exist, with different legal standings and purposes. Any of them could 
be potential investors in infrastructure and thus it is not necessary for this purpose to draw precise distinctions 
between the types of funds. For other purposes, taxation or prudential supervision for example, precise 
definitions will be needed.  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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in Asian infrastructure is suggested.
30
Finally, a portion of SWF funds should be used as official development assistance (ODA), 
although tapping SWFs set up as pension funds for ODA may be inappropriate. ODA 
contributions by SWFs are not explicitly mentioned in the GAPP, but the GAPP recognizes 
that social or environmental factors could be taken into consideration in lending. For ODA, a 
target of 1% is suggested.
 Equity investment by SWFs could also be 
encouraged, especially when the pattern of returns is uncertain or cannot be easily valued. 
Equity investments would be well suited to situations where the returns on the infrastructure 
have social or welfare benefits, such as educational or health benefits. 
31 This contribution recognizes that SWFs are official institutions 
subject to national policy priorities, and one strategy could be to focus any development aid 
into areas of financial market development and technical capacity in the financial sector. In 
Islamic finance, there is a zakat
32
On 2 April 2008, the World Bank proposed the “one-percent solution”, that SWFs invest 1% 
of their nearly US$3 trillion assets in Africa, or about US$30 billion (Mufson  2008). The 
proposal stressed equity investment. This total is significantly large, but for individual SWFs, 
does not represent a critical risk and less than needed for prudent diversification of the 
portfolio. Following this suggestion could bring some emerging economies into the group of 
providers of ODA.
 obligation for those that can afford it to provide a portion of 
earnings (2.5%) to the poor. The earnings of SWFs of Islamic states could be sources of 
zakat as ODA to those in need. Very roughly, annually this might equal about 0.1 to 0.2% of 
SWF asset holdings. To take an arbitrary example, this could amount to US$20 to US$40 
million annually from Malaysia’s Khazanah Fund. 
33
The receptivity of SWFs to making infrastructure investments is yet unknown. Some may be 
hesitant to take direct equity positions, but be willing to invest in securities based on the 
infrastructure investment or take equity positions in companies making the investment. A 
high level inquiry into SWFs and their governments (or the proposed standing organization 
of SWFs) might help to learn more about the potential and the conditions, and solicit views 
from SWFs on how they might contribute to infrastructure investment in Asia. 
 Alternatively, rather than make direct contributions, the SWFs might 
transfer funds to other government agencies that specialize in aid or capacity building. 
An important note of caution is that the use of SWFs for infrastructure investment in the 
home country or in other Asian countries could have macroeconomic or financial 
ramifications. Any SWF investment in infrastructure in the home country or elsewhere within 
Asia should be scrutinized to see that it does not contribute to overheating or contradiction of 
sterilization or other policies. One implication is that new regional oversight arrangements 
may be needed that bring SWFs under macroeconomic surveillance as an integral part of 
the overall macroeconomic and macrofinancial policy framework. An excellent example, 
identified by Radhakrishnan (2008), is India where a SWF has not been created, but the 
policy has been to channel reserves accumulations into infrastructure. In one promising, but 
                                                  
30 Estimates of total assets of Asian SWFs are imprecise, but 10% devoted to infrastructure would be around 
US$70 to US$100 billion. This portfolio adjustment would require several years, so the annual contribution, 
which might reasonably total less than US$20 billion per year, would clearly cover only a small portion of the 
annual financing gap. 
31 A 1% ODA contribution from total Asian SWF assets might yield something between US$7 billion and US$10 
billion annually, which is a large amount. It could be a direct contribution, but could also be leveraged into more 
investment if it enhances private lending. ODA provided by SWFs could be used in many ways, but one 
interesting option is to use it to provide enhancements to financial instruments issued for infrastructure 
projects, including instruments purchased by the SWF itself. Enhancements can include exchange rate 
guarantees, credit guarantees, coverage for grace periods, subordinated capital contributions, traffic 
guarantees, etc.  
32 Zakat is essentially a wealth tax. For more information, see Sulaiman (2003). 
33 For example, World Bank President Zoellick said that government-sponsored funds could invest equity in 
development, which would allow emerging countries to join the 185-nation development lender's aid program, 
through the support of their SWFs. Such contributions would avoid allegations sometimes made that bilateral 
aid is politically motivated (Mufson 2008).  ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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still relatively small, program (US$5 billion), India Infrastructure Finance Co. Ltd. set up an 
offshore subsidiary in London that can borrow reserves and lend them on to Indian 
infrastructure companies to meet their capital expenditure solely outside India. The main 
condition is that such financing should not lead to any domestic absorption of liquidity. 
Finally, two initiatives could serve as models for infrastructure investment that may apply to 
SWFs. Asia can create an Asian SWF dedicated to infrastructure development out of excess 
international reserve assets. Many state-owned enterprises in major Asian countries have 
been witnessing high savings and profit. Asian countries can also form national infrastructure 
funds based on the contribution of a portion of the excess profit of major state-owned 
enterprises.   
4.4.3. Mobilizing Funds from Islamic Financial Markets 
Islamic finance has a distinctly different form than conventional finance—no interest, no fixed 
returns, sharing of risk, prohibition of certain types of investment, and obligation to contribute 
to the poor, among others.
34
Zeti Akhtar Aziz, the governor of Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia’s central bank), has 
argued that Islamic financing will be critical to the future development of infrastructure in 
Asia. At the London Sukuk  Summit in June 2007, she mentioned that the global sukuk 
market is estimated to be US$18 billion and these funds could be utilized to increase liquidity 
in the Islamic world. The Islamic bond market has typically been 10 to 20 basis points lower 
than mainstream bonds, but more multilateral agencies are issuing sukuks to finance 
development projects and government agencies and the corporate sector have considered 
doing the same (Aziz 2007). 
 It is a growing field, but practices still vary and are unsettled, 
affected by differing interpretations of Islamic financial law. In many ways, it increasingly 
emulates the results of financing with conventional instruments, but sometimes with difficulty 
or inefficiency. While there are cases of blurring with conventional instruments, it remains 
largely separate from conventional finance.  
One major issue facing the prospect of utilizing Islamic finance for infrastructure investment 
is the shortfall of basic banking and savings instruments for Islamic populations. Many of the 
more than one billion Moslems in Asia have no, or limited, access to modern financial 
instruments. In some cases, Moslems may need to use conventional banks and instruments, 
but compensate through actions such as donating interest earnings as zakat contributions to 
the poor. The lack of basic banking facilities imposes major hardships on this population 
segment, which is denied the means to save and transact. Development of Islamic 
instruments to serve basic individual and community financial needs and effectively 
delivering them to the target population would have two important impacts. First, it would 
contribute to poverty alleviation for a very large population and, second, it would mobilize the 
savings of a very large population in ways that might help support infrastructure 
development. By taking action on increasing access to basic, Islamic financial services, over 
time a new pool of Islamic investment funds could be developed.
35
Another major issue in Islamic  finance for infrastructure investment involves bonds and 
equity participation. Markets for Islamic bonds and equity participation exist, called sukuk, 
which are based on principles of sharing of the profit or loss of investment projects. Kuala 
Lumpur and Dubai are currently the most active markets, but there is some activity in other 
Asian markets as well. Islamic bond and equity participation instruments are naturally suited 
for project finance and their potential should be explored through consultations early on in 
 
                                                  
34 For information on the background and characteristics of Islamic finance, and prospects for its future 
development, please refer to ISDB/IFSB (2005). 
35 Noibi (2008) of the Islamic Development Bank has said that Takaful instruments, which are a form of collective 
insurance, seem to be an appropriate means to gather funds within Islamic communities and provide financial 
protection for the individual contributors. Also, Ibrahim (2008) has said that injunctions to fight poverty are 
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the project development process so that the financing plan can be tailored to the specific 
requirements of Islamic finance. 
Prospects for using Islamic bonds to support infrastructure funding are also limited because 
of difficulties in constructing long-term instruments that are not specifically tied to sharing of 
income or loss on specific projects, which is not in the nature of many types of infrastructure 
projects, and because of lack of standardization of instruments because of unharmonized 
Shari’a  (Islamic law) interpretations, which acts to segment the market and prevent 
development of market signals that can help direct the flow of funding into high priority 
infrastructure projects. The Islamic Financial Services Board’s “Ten Year Framework and 
Strategies” states that harmonization of Shari’a interpretations and effective legal interaction 
with conventional finance will play an important role in fostering greater growth of the 
industry (ISDB/IFSB 2005). This is obviously a specialized topic  related to infrastructure 
finance, but mobilizing Asian savings and directing them to Asian and subregional 
infrastructure development will need to address how to involve the large Moslem community.  
Working with the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), which  channels donations for 
investment in infrastructure among other things, is another way that Islamic financing could 
be used for Asian infrastructure projects. Projects should consider how IsDB programs might 
link to ADB or other regional infrastructure initiatives, or how the IsDB programs might 
evolve to provide more support for infrastructure. In the past few years, the IsDB has begun 
issuing sukuk bonds in international capital markets, which opens the potential for future 
issuing of bonds focused on infrastructure development (Gulfnews 2005). In September 
2008, the IsDB and ADB signed a co-financing agreement in which both institutions stated 
that they would collaborate on projects in common member countries.
36
Significant funds for infrastructure investment should be available through Islamic bond and 
equity markets in Kuala Lumpur and the Middle East. This requires that consultations begin 
during the planning stages of infrastructure projects on how to configure the financial 
package to meet Shari’a requirements and to appeal to Islamic investors. Also, currently 
each project requires customization to meet Islamic requirements, but work is underway to 
create standardized documentation. This will greatly facilitate the process. ADB could create 
a small working group on Islamic Finance for Infrastructure to work primarily with the Islamic 
Financial Services Board in Kuala Lumpur and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) in 
Jeddah to promote this standardization and explore the potential for expanding  Islamic 
financing. The recent announcement of collaboration between the ADB and IsDB is a 
promising step in the right direction. 
 Each will contribute 
US$2 billion from 2009 to 2012 for a range of projects, including infrastructure projects. The 
agreement also opens new avenues to promote infrastructure investment by third party 
funds and through private sector participation (Gulfnews 2008). 
4.4.4. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)  
It is expected that the bulk of financing for new physical infrastructure (greenfield projects) 
and maintenance or upgrading of existing infrastructure (brownfield) projects will come from 
the public sector, ODA, or multilateral development banks, but the private sector also can 
contribute substantial amounts, up to perhaps 30% of total investment needs. For example, 
for the estimated investment in India, as mentioned above, the private sector is expected to 
contribute around 30% (about US$150 billion) of the total infrastructure spending, whereas 
the federal government will invest a further 37.2% and provincial governments will cover the 
remaining 32.8%.  
PPPs are required not only for funding, but also for technology and efficiency in the project 
implementation. In order to attract private sector funds, Asian governments need to create 
                                                  
36 Countries include: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, 
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good business environments and find ways to manage potential projects risks that cannot be 
addressed by the private sector. PPP projects could be undertaken through various 
modalities, such as joint ventures, concessions, management contracts, BOO (Build Own 
Operate),  BOT (Build Operate and Transfer),  BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer), and 
BOLT (Build Own Lease Transfer)
37
One of the major weaknesses of Asian developing countries is their level of skills and 
capacities in handling PPP projects, particularly in their procurement and service delivery. At 
the same time, the private sector should consider PPP infrastructure projects as a new 
market opportunity. They need to gather market intelligence  and conduct appropriate 
technical analysis to evaluate and prepare bankable or commercially viable projects in 
developing countries. At present, there exists a significant information asymmetry between 
the public and private sector regarding infrastructure development. Further details on the 
potential for PPP options are discussed in another paper prepared for the ADB/ADBI 
Flagship Study by van der Geest and Nunez-Ferrer (2010).  
.  
4.4.5. Asian Infrastructure Currency Unit Based Bond (AICU) 
The lengthy implementation of infrastructure projects exposes borrowers and lenders to 
substantial currency risk, which is one of the major risks for financing regional projects. This 
calls for financing schemes that can minimize exchange rate risk. One way to minimize 
exchange rate risk would be to create an Asian Infrastructure Currency Unit (AICU) 
consisting of major Asian and non-Asian advanced economies’ currencies. An AICU is 
simply an accounting device for use in valuing infrastructure investments and repayment 
obligations that equals some weighted measure of Asia and non-Asian currencies. An 
infrastructure AICU bond will have reduced exchange rate risk for Asian lenders and 
borrowing countries based on de facto  relative stability between Asian currencies.
38
The weights may depend on factors such as GDP, international reserves, trade or any other 
appropriate variable of those selected economies. A weighting scheme that uses the basket 
of currencies used for infrastructure investment itself merits consideration. Total 
infrastructure currency demand in Asia could be estimated, providing a measure of value 
related to the costs and benefits of the infrastructure projects. Investors would gain access to 
investment instruments using a standard measure of value that has muted exchange rate 
risk; borrowers would be able to raise funds that have value related to projects’ costs that 
would also have the feature of muted exchange rate risk. One variant of this weighting 
scheme includes only the weights of currencies estimated needed for infrastructure 
investment in Asia (or in a subregion such as ASEAN). A second variant adds the currency 
requirements for official funding of cross-border initiatives in Asia, such as funding of a 
development bank. In the second case, countries would pay their official obligations in AICU, 
giving it a natural initial market.  
 The 
AICU could be a precursor to the type of parallel currency described by Agarwala (2008), but 
it lacks many of the features of a true currency as it is basically just an accounting device. 
Europe created a similar valuation scheme that evolved over time, beginning with the 
European Unit of Account (EUA) and changing into the European Currency Unit (ECU) in 
1979, which ultimately became a real currency, the euro. The EUA was established as a 
“closed” basket of fixed quantities of the nine EEC currencies. In contrast, the ECU was 
intended to be revised every 5 years. The ECU was initially a virtual currency, with 
settlements made in other “real” currencies. Subsequently settlements were made in ECU. 
The synthetic ECU currency unit was also used for denomination of bonds, including private 
sector bonds. Many Asian countries cannot issue bonds denominated in their own 
currencies, but if AICU is established, they could issue AICU bonds. This would diversify 
                                                  
37 For more details on PPP modalities, please refer to Finlayson (2008) and van der Geest and Nunez-Ferrer 
(2010). . 
38 Should Asian countries collaborate in the future to enhance policy coordination to make the exchange rates 
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their risk by not issuing bonds in one international currency but in a basket of Asian 
currencies (Castell et al. 2007). Creating a virtual unit such as the AICU should involve 
surveillance of the participating currencies by a regional entity because changes in any 
currency in the basket affects the weighted average value and could force fellow participants 
in the scheme to make adjustments as a result of poor policy of another member. Thus, 
each currency should be obligated to bear the burden of macroeconomic surveillance 
because all currencies are affected by the actions of each individual currency (this oversight 
feature is in line with the proposed Asian Monetary Fund (AMF)
39 or Asian Surveillance 
Unit
40
It would be useful to create an institution for managing regional infrastructure financing 
bonds (or build such capability into existing institutions). Countries participating in a regional 
project could raise funds through AICU denominated bonds, which would minimize the risk 
of repayment for any individual country. The entity might also include arrangements to 
guarantee AICU-denominated bonds issued by public entities, or provide insurance for a fee 
to private issuers.  
 model, in which a transnational oversight entity is created. 
5.  FRAMEWORKS TO SUPPORT FINANCIAL MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION IN ASIA 
In addition to specific programs that promote infrastructure finance, efforts should also be 
made to enhance and harmonize the legal, institutional, and governance frameworks in ways 
that support cross-border investment and contribute to the general stability and effectiveness 
of financial markets. The experience of Europe highlights the very important roles, albeit 
indirect, that building harmonized frameworks had on the effectiveness of financial markets. 
Similar steps in Asia can contribute to making effective use of Asia’s savings to support its 
own infrastructure investment and development. 
5.1  Harmonization of Financial Practice and Infrastructure 
The experience in Europe strongly emphasizes the importance of creating an overarching 
framework of comparable practices, infrastructure, and codes affecting the financial sector. 
The ability of an economy to attract investment is seen as depending on creating a stable 
environment in which investments are secure, macroeconomic risks are minimized, and 
competitive conditions result in unbiased market signals that attract investments. Financial 
market distortions can arise from many sources, and the Europeans have methodically 
attempted to increase harmonization between countries as a necessary part of creating a 
unified financial system for Europe. Areas of potential harmonization include bankruptcy 
codes, licensing, financial accounting, dispute resolution, provisioning and recognition of 
impairment, taxation, capital adequacy and other supervisory requirements, disclosures, and 
income repatriation, among others. Asia should systematically review where infrastructure, 
standards, and practices hinder equal treatment of cross-border investments or create 
frictions in cross-border flows. Coordinated efforts in Asia should be taken to introduce 
harmonized practices and in some ways this process is already underway as countries 
implement international standards and best practices. These efforts should be strengthened 
and accelerated (including providing significant technical assistance to poorer economies), 
because they offer—in addition to their other benefits—ways to strengthen the effectiveness 
of financial markets. The improvements will enhance the general investment atmosphere in 
Asia, and help in infrastructure financing.  
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As mentioned, the impediments to regional integration are both non-financial and financial in 
nature. In Asia, work on dismantling non-financial barriers seems to be progressing steadily, 
as can be seen from Soesastro’s (2007) discussion on how the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) Blueprint focuses on integration of trade and infrastructure and supporting 
institutions and policies. Progress is also being made on the financial side, especially by 
ASEAN working groups, but it appears that this effort could be intensified.  
5.2  Regional Mechanisms for Macroeconomic Oversight 
Macroeconomic stability is important in reducing risk that can hinder infrastructure 
investment. Poorly designed macroeconomic policies can make investments in specific 
countries unattractive and can result in recessions, high inflation, volatile exchange rates, 
etc. Good macroeconomic policy making is thus a precondition for infrastructure investment. 
Also, cross-border investment would benefit from coordinated macroeconomic oversight to 
promote macroeconomic stability in all affected countries, and to coordinate in areas such as 
defending a configuration of exchange rates. A strong macroeconomic oversight and policy 
development apparatus is needed—the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was a movement in the 
right direction, but it has faltered in this regard—and the type of structured oversight and 
consultation offered by an institution such as an AMF should be seriously considered.  
The Chiang Mai framework includes a provision for “Economic Review and Policy Dialogue” 
at regular intervals at the minister and deputy levels to work towards prevention of financial 
crises and swift taking of remedial actions. Recently, there has been increased discussion 
about strengthening the CMI, including raising the size of potential rescue packages and 
strengthening the oversight function to build a credible system in ASEAN+3 to monitor the 
economic and financial situation of member countries. Such a strengthening of CMI would 
further its functions for effective Asian macroeconomic oversight. ASEAN+3 countries have 
agreed to set up an ASEAN+3 Surveillance Unit in Singapore (ASEAN 2009). This is a 
strong step towards building an AMF. 
Bolstering macroeconomic stability will require dealing with the cluster of  related issues 
associated with the large accumulation of reserves, exchange rates (external and between 
Asian countries), inflation control, monetary sterilization, stability of inward and outward 
capital flows, and sovereign wealth funds.  These have become regional issues and a 
regional oversight and policy development entity should be created to handle them. Such a 
regional entity or institute could also function to determine how the large accumulation of 
reserves and SWF assets could be channeled into investment in Asia. 
5.3  Regional Mechanisms for Financial Stability Oversight 
A similar line of argument applies to financial stability. A strong banking system, well-
functioning securities markets, reliable payments systems, etc., all supervised by effective 
regulators, are needed to maintain financial stability. A coordinated effort by financial sector 
regulators is called for to create stable financial conditions that can bolster infrastructure 
investment flows. Creating an Asian equivalent to the Financial Stability Board now 
embodied in the proposal for an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD) by ADB President 
Kuroda is recommended to facilitate this coordinated effort. Among tasks for the AFSD 
would be to identify and promote high quality standards and practices throughout Asia, 
support development of mechanisms for cooperation between national supervisors (in all 
financial subsectors), and address issues related to crisis management and lender of last 
resort situations (ADB 2008c). The AFSD should also take steps to ensure that rapid 
changes in financial markets associated with the globalization of finance or integration of 
regional markets do not introduce new risks to financial soundness. Finally, the current 
turmoil in international financial markets provides a sharp warning to all Asian countries that 
preventive steps to avoid financial distress in Asia are an extremely high priority, and that ADBI Working Paper 229    Bhattacharyay 
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there is an urgent need for an institution such as the AFSD to address threats to Asian 
financial systems.  
5.4  Final Thoughts: Global Financial Crisis as a spur to Asian 
Integration 
The financing of national and regional infrastructure in Asia for increased connectivity and 
integration should be viewed in the context of the ongoing global financial and economic 
crisis and the rebalancing of the global financial system, including its governance and the 
building of a sustainable, integrated, resilient, and balanced Asia. The severity and global 
nature of the crisis has forced many changes—among them is a new view that the 
macroeconomic policies being followed in Asia were components of global imbalances that 
need to be redressed. One piece of the rebalancing is that Asia must become more inward 
oriented so that more of its savings shift from short-term investment in external markets 
toward regional long-term productive investments, of which infrastructure investment is ideal. 
Providing appropriate market infrastructure (investment tools, integrated markets, innovative 
and cost effective financing options, clearing operations, good cooperation and coordination 
frameworks, sound rules and regulations, stable internal and external macroeconomic and 
macroprudential conditions, and business environments conducive to private sector 
participation, among others) would bolster the development of efficient and secure markets 
in which long-term, cross-border infrastructure investment could thrive. All this 
simultaneously would help create rebalanced, resilient markets that could be part of the 
solution to the crisis. This would facilitate Asia’s move toward rebalanced growth, with less 
dependence on exports to advanced economies, increased intraregional trade, and 
increased regional demand and consumption.  
The development and integration of Asian financial markets could serve twin goals. It could 
enhance  Asian integration through enhanced regional connectivity — financing  the 
development  and implementation  regional infrastructure projects—which would have  high 
pay-offs for all participating countries. At the same time, Asian financial and technical 
resources could be effectively mobilized and allocated to meet the large investment needs in 
productive sectors like infrastructure 
Both the prevention and management of crises and the building of regional infrastructure 
require a high degree of cooperation and partnership between countries so that increasingly 
common solutions can be offered and policy and technical friction between countries can be 
minimized. Regional efforts, such as the CMI or the renewed commitment to the ABMI, are 
pointing a way, as are various calls to create regional macroprudential or financial 
cooperation entities. Efforts are becoming more cooperative—at this point most are multi-
country in nature, but over time some elements may become more supranational—and a 
process of integration of aims and methods is underway, spurred both by technical 
advantages and by the financial crisis. Regional infrastructure investment and development 
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